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The United Kingdom’s Commission on Ethnic and Racial Disparities, led by Tony
Sewell, has recently published a report (“the Sewell Report”), which has been
widely discredited since its launch by charities, education unions, academics and
politicians. The report contends that institutional racism is an overused concept
(p. 27), that slavery should be reimagined to have served the positive ends of
berthing a culturally “remodelled Africa/Britain” (p. 8), that racialised minority groups
should no longer assume that they may be disadvantaged owing to racism and
should “help themselves” through empowerment in what it describes as an “era of
participation” (p. 7). This is all premised on the idea that the UK is essentially a fair
society in which opportunities are generally open to its citizens, with few exceptions.
The report contends that the UK can serve as a beacon on racial equality for Europe
and the rest of the world (p. 8).
Far from a guiding light, I would warn European constitutional lawyers and policy
makers to understand this as an urgent warning. Using the UK’s progressive track
record of legal provisions on racial discrimination, the report moves to obscure
racism’s systemic aspects. There is a profound disconnect between the theory of the
UK’s legal protections against racism and the lived reality of race in Britain, which
reveals race as an important and persistent determinant of social experience.
Context
Leaving aside systemic and structural forms of racism, which domestic legal systems
in Europe are uniformly bad at recognising and addressing, legal conceptions
of racial discrimination and approaches to anti-racism differ within Europe. For
instance, France bans the concept of race categorically. Germany did not have
domestic anti-discrimination law that covered racial discrimination until 2006. In
most of Europe, there is a presumptive ‘prohibition with exceptions’ with regard
to collecting data on race and ethnic origin. At least in theory, some facets that
characterise the legal discourse around race and racism in the UK seem exemplary.
The UK has had racial equality legislation in place since the 1960s, which means
that some basic vocabulary and infrastructure has been available for the legal
recognition of racial harms and injustices since. Further, the UK encourages the
collection of data disaggregated by race, particularly in the employment market,
in policing encounters and in education, in order to track disparities and identify
potentially discriminatory practices in these sectors. This has certainly helped
anti-racism efforts to gain traction in the legal domain—a fact that should not
be undervalued. Without being able to identify and discuss patterns of racial
disadvantage, we would be unable to generate the types of political discussions and
broad initiatives that rely on statistical data as a basis for action.
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However, the legal progress over the past half century has not dealt with, once and
for all, persistent forms of racial discrimination and inequity. Whether legal progress
has even resulted in proportionally less racial discrimination than on the continent is
debatable, since enormous racial disparities still exist in the UK across the sectors
of employment, education and criminal justice, among other areas of social life,
including housing, public health, and within the immigration system. The fact that we
can measure certain forms of racial inequity does not mean that we have sufficiently
dealt with the problem of racism, its structural nature, or its relationship to empire,
as discussed in Empire’s Endgame: Racism and the British State. Britain still has a
long way to go in addressing structural racism, as evidenced by various episodes
in recent years, such as the Hostile Environment Policy, the Prevent Policy, the
Windrush Scandal, and the Grenfell Tower disaster.
In short, whilst the UK has had what are arguably the most nuanced and
longstanding legal and social policies to track racial discrimination and litigate it in
the courts, it is also a country where racial discrimination still characterises many
aspects of social life, albeit in a different way than it might have half a century ago.
The Sewell Report and the Misnomer of ‘Disparity’
The Sewell Report has attracted broad criticism. It essentially argues that
widespread structural discrimination is no longer a problem in the UK. Critics
argue that this is not only incorrect, but that it mischaracterises research on health
disparities, serves to discredit anti-racism work, and sidelines robust debate on
racism.
In my view, the Report highlights a profound misunderstanding of how racism works
and how it is treated in law. The use of data to justify conclusions in the Report is
generally selective and unreliable. My focus, however, is on the way it suggests we
should conceive of racism as an analytical and interpretive category. It introduces
a framework for mapping the differences between what it refers to as explained
and unexplained racial disparities on one hand, and forms of racial discrimination
and racism on the other. This framework seeks to roll back decades of work in
understanding racism and translating that understanding into advocacy and social
policy. The stated purpose of this framework is to counter the misapplication of terms
like institutional racism to situations where a racial disparity can be established but
evidence of discrimination has not yet been determined. However, it never clearly
defines what this evidence should look like, but it simultaneously forecloses the idea
that racism should be an expansive notion, which devalues the scholarship and
social thought of the last half-century (p. 45). The framework ultimately obscures
racism by setting an unattainably high bar for determining what it is, which threatens
to shut down debate on scrutinising potential racism.
1. Explained Racial Disparities
First, the concept “explained racial disparities”, as defined in the report, implies
that if disparities can be attributed to factors such as geography, class or sex, they
cannot also be a function of race or racism. This is underscored when on page 6, the
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report states “[t]he evidence shows that geography, family influence, socio-economic
background, culture and religion have more significant impact on life chances than
the existence of racism,” as though race has no bearing on these other factors.
Race, culture and religion are intertwined social categories in Britain. Moreover,
this ignores the past 30 years of legal thinking on intersectionality, as coined by
Kimberlé Crenshaw—where one lives or one’s socio-economic background may
very well have to do with the intersection of race, sex, and other social categories.
So, if another factor besides race contributes to one’s disadvantage, it does not
then neutralise the role that race plays. To invalidate the importance of racism
as a contributing factor to a given racial disparity moves us farther away from
understanding how racism interacts with other forms of marginalisation and
exclusion, not closer to it.
1. Unexplained Racial Disparities
Second, the concept “unexplained racial disparities” suggests that even if racial
disparities are persistent, so long as we have no conclusive evidence of what is
causing them, we should not consider that they may be expressions of a form of
racism (institutional, systemic, etc.). In other words, if racism can’t be proven, it
doesn’t exist. However, if we have statistical evidence of the impact of policies and
practices on a racialised group, a clear context in which this disparity is playing out,
and the social commitment to make things better, what is lost by understanding such
a persistent condition of disadvantage as a form of racism? This is, after all, the way
the UK Supreme Court understands the role of evidence of the cause of disparities
when determining indirect racial discrimination (see Essop 2017 UKSC 27).
The report suggests that we should regard these disparities as unsolved mysteries
until they can be evidenced, but it never defines what such evidence should
entail. Evidence of overt racial bias or intention to discriminate are not the most
relevant factors in evaluating racial stratification. It has long been known that racial
disadvantage does not rely on an overtly malicious and intentional decision having
been made to produce a given racial disparity, the way it may perhaps have been
in the mid-20th century (even the report agrees that overt discrimination is not the
most common form in today’s Britain, p. 27). In light of this, the UK Supreme Court
provides a more realistic appraisal of what constitutes racism than the Sewell Report
—that is to say, once a disparity has been determined to exist, one needs only
look to the context as a factor for understanding the disparity and its effects before
deciding that (indirect) racial discrimination has occurred.
1. Institutional and systemic racism
Third, the report uses the 1999 Macpherson Report (p. 34) as a reference point for
conceptualising institutional forms of racism. There are two points of disconnect
between the report’s use of institutional racism and the reality of racism in modern
Britain.
First, the report refers to ‘an institution,’ in the singular, rather than recognising that
the forms of racial exclusion, marginalisation and disadvantage that may occur as a
result of the postures, policies or practices of adjacent institutions may tell a larger,
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more detailed story of racial discrimination than the view of a single institution. One
might argue that the Sewell Report then goes on to define “systemic racism” as
precisely this register of discrimination; however, a guiding motif running through the
report is that institutional racism is, as a term, being overused and misapplied, and
the suggestion is not that one should be using the term ‘systemic racism’ instead.
Rather, the implication is that situations in which institutional racism is being used
should not be referred to as racism or discrimination at all, but rather demoted to the
terrain of explained or unexplained disparities.
The second point of disconnect builds upon the first. The Macpherson Report,
crucially, suggests that unwitting forms of discrimination count as discrimination.
This means that intention to discriminate is not a prerequisite characteristic of
institutional racism. This is important because it also means that the effects on
the group being underserved or otherwise disadvantaged should be the primary
measure of discrimination, not the intention of the institutional actors, who may
not appreciate the impacts of their policies until the policies are challenged and
reviewed. This, in my view, is also supported by the general legal test for proving
indirect discrimination—in short, that a facially neutral policy, practice or criterion
(PPC) that has a disparate negative impact on a group defined by a protected
characteristic (e.g., race, sex, religion, etc.) is indirectly discriminatory, and it is
up to the actor or institution (e.g., employer) to justify the PPC by claiming that
there is a legitimate aim for it, and the PPC is necessary and proportionate to
achieving the aim. It is not a perfect comparison to compare discrimination claims
under equality laws (in this case, the UK Equality Act) to the analysis of institutional
racism, but my point is that it would be a break from the way the UK and the rest of
Europe understand the burden of proof for discrimination to require a measure of
intentionality or the presence of overtly racist attitudes in order to argue that racial
discrimination is present in or across their institutions.
Implications for Anti-Racism in Europe
“Society has ‘defined racism down’ to encompass attitudes and behaviours that
would not have been considered racist in the past. This is one reason for the rising
sensitivity, the language of microaggressions and safety, and stretching the meaning
of racism without objective data to support it.” (the Sewell Report, p. 45).
The Sewell Report demonstrates wilfully incorrect analysis of race and racism in
British society, and European countries would do wise not to emulate this line of
reasoning. While the Report recognises the importance of accurate data collection
in determining racial disparities, it rejects the notion that these disparities, persistent
over generations, should be seen as evidence of racial disadvantage and a case to
be answered. The notion that social discourse on racism has become too expansive
sounds mainly like a desperate attempt to block the burgeoning scholarship, activism
and global discourse that seeks to understand race in its historical relationality with
colonialism, capitalism and forms of cultural imperialism; for those uncomfortable
with acknowledging the yardstick of the past is an inadequate measure for the
present, the wide breadth of racial analysis is surely jarring. But one should not
forget that slavery, apartheid and colonialism were, after all, not always regarded as
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racist per se, but rather as civilisational and religious destiny. We cannot wish racism
away by simply deciding that it no longer exists. We must strive to supply the level of
intellectual rigour that is necessary to do actual anti-racism work.
If race can serve as a meaningful category of analysis in predicting opportunities,
wealth, criminalisation and even mortality rates, then we cannot simply leave such
disparities to remain outside the realm of how we understand racial stratification.
Nor can or should we expect to encounter a singular cause of racial disadvantage
in a given sector or rely on intentional racism to continue to be the main source of
racial stratification. The cumulative, intersectional and historical aspects of racism’s
embeddedness in European societies makes racism a difficult phenomenon to
regulate with law and policy, but as we have seen with the policy of constitutional
colourblindness in France, former US President Donald Trump’s executive order
banning the term ‘structural racism,’ and now with downgrading patterns of racism
to mere disparity in the UK’s Sewell Report, attempts to delegitimise the language of
racism do little more than make racism more difficult to identify, discuss and combat.
These attempts stifle honest and nuanced social exchange about power result in an
impoverished set of tools for a thorough-going analysis of societal racism.
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